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ABSTRACT 
This is an inquiry into the ways the state is constituted as an effective legal 
fiction. It is based on the premise that the state was not constituted, once and for 
all, some three centuries ago (as Bourdieu suggests) but that the existence of the 
state relies on continuing legal and social processes. The focus is on the 
translation from the legal to the social, specifically the semiotic interaction 
between law, space and daily life in the dynamics of this on-going mise en scène. 
This requires re-thinking a number of semiotic issues: first, Lefebvre's challenge 
to a semiotics which neglects the place of the material (body, space) and, 
second, a challenge to Lefebvre's assertions that the state operates in a realm of 
freedom in switching 'at will' between codes. Third, it is possible to question the 
conditions by which the state operates as a 'floating signifier' which maintains its 
domination by overwhelming us with its excess meanings.  
 
The inquiry proceeds by analysing the legal semiotics of space in different 
settings: the axis as an expression of legal and state power, from the courtroom 
to the capital city (Rome, Washington, Canberra), and street names with legal 
referents (Montréal and Mexico City, in addition to the above). After considering 
these self conscious attempts at meaning-making, the article concludes that the 
legal constitution of the state in urban space is not determined by a single wilful 
semiotic regime, but (taking insights from de Certeau) is contingent upon the 
interpretations and enactments of people who use the spaces. Except in the 
controlled environments of the courtroom and the planned capital city, everyday 
life is continually reconstituting the meanings of law and the state.  
 
 
1 Constituting the state 
 
The relationship between law and the state is a key problem for legal semiotics 
which may be approached by questioning the influence, constraining and 
supportive, of law upon the state. Law constrains the state to conform to the rule 
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of law, to be an "Empire of laws and not of men"1, in the classical English 
formula. On  the other hand, the law plays a central role in creating the state as a 
fictio legis. Let me sketch some dimensions to either of these approaches from a 
semiotic point of view before introducing the more limited scope of the present 
inquiry.  
 
To represent the law as ruling over the state, without human intervention ("not of 
men"), requires a semiotic manoeuvre of some intricacy. The law must be seen 
to have greater power or authority than the state, despite the fact that the 
legislature which passes the laws, and the courts which determine their 
application, are both arms of state power. They rely on state revenue and on 
other state institutions–electoral commissions, police, executive departments, 
infrastructure development and maintenance, parliamentary and judicial staff–to 
sustain all their activities. Add to this the fact that the legislatures and courts are 
composed of women and men who do the legislating and the determining. That 
each of these facts is quite obvious and widely accepted, side by side with a 
widespread faith in the rule of law, to which we hear constant appeals and 
references, generally in good faith, indicates something of a triumph for legal 
semiotics. Law is successfully represented as independent of the individuals who 
administer it, and as having an independent authority over the institutions upon 
which it relies for its sustenance.  
 
On the other hand, the state has been seen as a creature of law. Bourdieu sees 
the role of the law in constituting the state as part of a web of accumulation of 
'symbolic capital', with the state at the centre. While various forms of symbolic 
capital accumulate in military, financial and legal fields, he sees the state as the 
central force in unifying and exercising symbolic power.2 The fundamental 
importance of the law may be seen in the fact that the state is first constructed as 
a fictio legis, while subsequently attaining autonomy and its own independent 
power.3  
 
This transition from legal fiction to autonomous power raises the question, how 
has the situation changed? In each of Bourdieu's descriptions of the state's 
increased autonomy in the essay "Rethinking the State", we find the state itself 
as the protagonist. There are two problems with this account, the first being the 
inherent difficulty of lifting oneself up by one's own shoe strings. If the 'state' was 
a fiction how did it actualise 'itself'? The second problem is that Bourdieu's 
account suggests that the state, once created as a fiction of law, takes on a 
concrete reality over time. Is it not more helpful to understand that this creation is 
                                            
1 Harrington, 1656, quoted Fred Dallmayr, “Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law”, in Deconstruction 
and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson. 
(New York & London: Routledge, 1992), 283-304 at 286. 
2 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 47. 
3 Supra n. 2 at 58. 
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a continuous process, and to agree with Correas that "[t]his is the principal 
function of the law: the creation of the fictional entity called the state".4  
 
From a survey of sociological and Marxist theories of the state Abrams concluded 
that the state only exists as a "collective (mis)representation" which "never 
emerges except as a claim to domination".5 It is nevertheless treated as an 
entity, a noun rather than a verb, despite the lack of any agreed or perceptible 
"natural fact" in which we can discover "the state". Of course, semioticians must 
be sceptical of Abrams' statement, "Social facts should not be treated as things." 
There is an important sense in which all things are social facts, and facts 
themselves are always socially constructed.6 However, this scepticism, together 
with Abrams' conclusion that "the state is not the reality which stands behind the 
mask of political practice [but] is itself the mask"7, sets the scene for a semiotic 
inquiry into /the state/ as a signifier, and the role the law plays in this semiotic 
arrangement.  
 
In keeping with the suggestion that we may understand the state better through 
verbs than as a noun, one could look at the state's actions. It has ministries 
which collect and administer money, which build public infrastructure, which run 
educational and health programs and agencies. It has police who maintain order, 
assist in the administration of insurance by keeping records of property loss and 
damage, and bring suspected criminals before courts. These courts pass 
sentence and resolve disputes, administered by the state albeit 'at arms' length' 
(allowing for arms of different lengths in various jurisdictions). I have referred 
above to other, legislative, functions of the state.  
 
It is clear from this description that there are innumerable different functions and 
functionaries making up 'the state'. Each of these manifestations exists in 
relative–or even explicit–isolation from the others. While they are brought 
together under the one signifier of 'the state' they are also divided by the 
'separation of powers' into the various arms–executive, legislative and judicial–in 
a move which maintains the representational distance between 'law' and 'the 
state'. The state is thus at once represented as one entity and, like the Christian 
signifier the /Holy Trinity/, three entities in one.  The symbolic architecture of the 
state points back to a certain unity.  Flags, stories (of history or identity) and, 
above all, law frame the state as a representation of unity or power: a more or 
less convincing "claim to domination".   
 
                                            
4  '[É]sa es la principal función del derecho: la creación del ente ficticio llamado estado.' Óscar 
Correas, Pluralismo Jurídico, Alternatividad y Derecho Indígena (Mexico DF: Fontamara, 2003), 
61. 
5 Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)”, Journal of Historical 
Sociology 1/1 (1981), 58-89 at 75, 77. 
6 The 'fact' was itself originally a legal fiction until science appropriated it from law in the 
seventeenth century. Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England 1550 - 1720 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), passim; Maria Bettetini, Figure di verità: La finzione nel Medioevo 
occidentale (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), 4-6; Yan Thomas, “Fictio Legis: L'empire de la fiction 
Romaine et ses limites médiévales”, Droits 21 (1995), 17-63 at 17-18  
7 Supra n. 5 at 82 
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This luxuriant proliferation of meanings ascribed to the one signifier /the state/  
embodies that excess of signification over denotation which is characteristic of 
the floating signifier. The /state/ like the /separation of powers/ or the /Holy 
Trinity/ signifies so much that its specific denotations could never exhaust the 
possibilities: there will always be some remainder, some possible meaning which 
is not enacted. (Which never could be enacted because it is a mystery.) With this 
excess of langue over parole, the floating signifier means more than we can ever 
say, leaving the power of the signifier with force to spare. This goes a good way 
to explaining the mysterious semiotic power of /the state/ as a signifier.  
 
What remains to be explained, however, is the process by which the legal fiction 
sustains this signifier in practice. To delve further into this semiotic puzzle, I 
intend to consider the contingencies of this process of legal constitution of the 
state. One can ask how law constructs the fiction of the state in its normal, 
efficacious operation. Another way to see how the legal fiction of the state works 
is to ask under what circumstances it does not work. I hope to shed more light on 
this process by asking under what circumstances this success may be 
challenged: are there ways in which law and its various semiotic manouevres fail 
to constitute a successful claim to dominance?  
 
I have proposed that the successful constitution of the state as a legal fiction 
involves establishing it as a floating signifier, a sign with excess meanings that 
cannot all be spoken so that they overwhelm everyday semiosis with mysterious 
possibilities. This suggests that we might look for failures or 'misfires'8 in 
constituting the state in the converse to the floating signifier: in everyday 
semiosis which gives its own meanings to the symbols of the state. If everyday 
life were thus able to speak its own meanings of state symbols, meanings which 
did not constitute the excesses of the floating signifier, but instead referred back 
to its own everyday activities, then it might subvert the semiotics which builds the 
legal fiction of the state.  
 
This approach sets out to discover whether it is possible for a sign to mean less 
than it says. Can denotation overwhelm signification? In particular, is this 
possible in the case of those signs which constitute the legal fiction of the state? 
And, if it is, how does this affect the power of the state? If state power rests on 
the excessive signification of the floating signifier, then surely it cannot remain 
untouched if that signification is hollowed out, if the language of its legal 
constitution is overlaid with chatter and the everyday practice of communication.  
Such a signifier would not float on clouds of unexpressed meanings, dazzling us 
with its possibilities.  Instead it would be submerged under excessive enactments 
of its meaning: we would express more than it could ever mean. 
 
The question of law's effective constitution of the floating signifier of the state is 
both a pragmatic question for the political sociology of law, and a theoretical 
                                            
8 I use this term in the same sense and context as J. L. Austin did when applying it to failed 
performatives. J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980) This is discussed further below.  
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question for semiotics. If the floating signifier was the "guiding concept of the 
human sciences in the twentieth century",9 it is time to explore the possibility of 
exactly the opposite relationship between the sign and its meaning, through a 
reading of the quotidian reinterpretation of the legal signifiers of state power. I 
propose to consider these questions through some instances of the spatial 
semiotics of law and the state. I will show a number of ways in which spatial 
signifiers promote the state as a legal fiction, and I will also inquire into some 
others which are open to the risk of alternative constructions and interpretations.  
 
2 Spatial semiotics 
 
There are theoretical and methodological reasons for my choice of space as the 
site for this investigation. The process by which law constituted the state as the 
central force of symbiolic power was characterised, in western law and state 
development, by the increasing identification of law with space and place: the 
place of the crime, the uniformity of jurisdiction over a territory. "In brief, the 
competence delegated over a certain ressort (territory) replaced statutory 
precedence or authority exercised directly over persons."10 Weber also 
documented the increasing importance of lex terrae which relied on spatial, 
rather than personal, markers of jurisdiction.11 Fitzpatrick has posited that space, 
as an "existential imperative", is particularly well-suited to the role of grounding 
the law.12 Legal theory thus leads us to expect law and space to work together in 
the process of constituting the jurisdiction and, hence, the power of the modern 
state.13  
 
There are also important reasons to test the applicability of semiotic methods to 
the investigation of this relationship between law and space. That law is a 
particularly fertile field for semiotic analysis need hardly be argued in this journal. 
The conjunction between law, semiotics and space may require more 
introduction.14 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre explicitly takes issue with 
the "σημειοτικη", "grammatology" and "semiology" of Kristeva, Derrida and 
Barthes respectively. His general critique of all of these approaches is their 
elision of the connections between the social or physical world and that of mental 
concepts or language. This is expressed as the discovery of a theoretical 
"coupure or rupture of break" which for Lefebvre is no more than a lack of 
                                            
9 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005), 37. 
10 Bourdieu sees the defining moment of this development in France in the ordinance of 1670 
which centralised Royal power. Supra n. 2 at 49.  
11 Max Weber, Economy and Society.  An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, trans. E. Fischoff et 
al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 696-8. 
12 Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 104. 
13 Seec also Richard Mohr, “Law and Identity in Spatial Contests”, National Identities 5/1 (2003), 
53-66. 
14 Denis Brion has explored these links in a number of papers, on issues as diverse as shopping 
centres, surface and mining rights in land, and the rights of landlords and tenants, collected in 
Denis J. Brion, Pragmatism and Judicial Choice (New York: Peter Lang, 2003) 
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philosophical attention to a whole area of social and physical relations: it 
"becomes the locus of a 'theoretical practice' which is separated from social 
practice".15   
 
Lefebvre's materialist critique draws attention to the constitution of spatial 
semiotic codes at the level of practice, and not just of knowledge: "a spatial code 
is not simply a means of reading or interpreting space: rather it is a means of 
living in that space, of understanding it and of producing it".16 Barthes is criticised 
for neglecting the material on both "sides" of his analysis.  
 
"On the near side, what is overlooked is the body. When "Ego" arrives in an 
unknown country or city, he first experiences it through every part of his body – 
through his senses of smell and taste, as (provided he does not limit this by 
remaining in his car) through his legs and feet."17 
 
Taken together with Lefebvre's emphasis on the production of space, this 
corporeal approach is particularly valuable as a guide to the present 
investigation. However, his analysis fails at the other "side" of his critique, where 
Lefebvre accuses Barthes of mistakenly trying to decode power. Lefebvre puts a 
whole area of theoretical analysis out of play: "For power has no code. The state 
has control of all existing codes … and can shift from one to another at will. The 
state manipulates codes."18 The 'state' controlling codes, and shifting between 
them "at will" glosses over all the important ways that various elements of the 
state may construct spaces as signifiers, decode them and seek to specify the 
semiotic framework by which the citizens decode may them. Lefebvre's orthodox 
Marxist mistake of essentialising 'the state' is apparent in this towering noun, 
which even has a 'will'.19 This a priori rejection of any questioning of the semiotics 
of state power deprives Lefebvre's work of a vital element. Bourdieu's maxim is 
relevant here: "when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough".20 It is 
exactly the parameters and dialectical relationships of these codes which must 
be questioned in analysing the capacity and limits of law to constitute the state.  
 
This inquiry takes up at the point where Lefebvre simply assumes that the state 
will be successful in controlling the semiotic regime. In the following pages I 
analyse examples of this success, which, as I have already proposed, rests on 
the excessive signification of state symbols. This excess of signification is 
attained, as I will show, with considerable effort, which is glossed over by 
Lefebvre's offhand attribution of will to the state in controlling and shifting 
between codes. I also seek situations in which codes shift according to 
interpretive processes which are not controlled by the state. The state is 
constituted in more contingent ways when everyday semiosis overtakes the 
                                            
15 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
5-6. 
16 Suppra n. 15 at 47-48. This critique could be read as sympathetic to Peircean semiotics though 
it in fact derives from Marxian praxis rather than pragmatics. 
17 Supra n. 15 at 162. 
18 Supra n. 15 at 162. 
19 See my critique of this position above and Abrams' broader critique, supra n. 5. 
20 Supra n. 2 at 36. 
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coding of the state, so that quotidian meanings build up around those symbols 
which only might imply state power. If they might also imply other meanings 
altogether, this would open up the possibility of a semiotic inversion of the excess 
meaning of the signifier. These alternative spatial and semiotic practices will help 
to discover whether the power constituting the state is determined by the langue 
of symbolic structures or is contingent on the parole of the everyday.  
 
Bourdieu defines the state as the entity having the monopoly on symbolic power. 
The real president is distinguished from the madman who claims to be Napoleon 
by "the fact that he is recognized as founded to do so." 21  That recognition is 
based in law.  Law is "social magic that works".22 Magic is only convincing if it is 
done before our very eyes, nothing up the sleeves.  For all the conceit of the 
lawyers that the force of law rests on the power of reason and the vigour of their 
arguments, the magic we are talking about here works through the body and 
space.23  
 
The present inquiry investigates interactions between law and space which  
illuminate ways in which law constitutes the signifier of state power. At the same 
time these interactions provide an opportunity to consider the overlay of 
alternative lived constructions, representations and interpretations of space and 
social relationships. I proceed by inquiring into the ways in which law and state 
power is represented spatially (by means of intentional building or naming 
projects) and how those codes are read, used and re-coded by the people who 
occupy those spaces.  
 
In each case the references to law are literal: they include the orientation and 
location of courts and other vital state legal institutions, and the names of 
particular laws and law-makers which are chosen for places. I begin with the use 
of the axis as a signifier of power: this is found in courtrooms and projected out 
into cities. The axis is one of the most explicit and ubiquitous signifiers of power, 
from baroque Rome to Washington DC and the purpose built Australian capital, 
Canberra. With its linear and visual one-dimensionality, it both allocates 
responsibility and casts its representation of power over the city. My other study 
inquires into place names referring to laws and lawmakers: the ways they are 
changed or retained, decoded and re-coded. This study takes up the names of 
streets already considered as axes, and expands on those with examples from 
Mexico and Québec. Street names themselves are a manifestation of the 
symbolic power of law in constituting the state, so they offer a useful study of the 
capacity of symbols to retain their excessive powers of signification in the face of 
so much quotidian overlay. 
 
                                            
21  Supra n. 2 at 52. 
22  Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991) 42. 
23  '[I]n order to fully understand the immediate submission that the state order elicits, it is 
necessary to break with the intellectualism of the neo-Kantian tradition to acknowledge that 
cognitive sttructures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body.' Supra n. 2 at 
54. 
 8 
In each case the signifier refers to law and more. Beyond the interpretability of a 
legal text, these floating signifiers speak of the sources of law and the 
possibilities of civic order. In exploring the extent and consequences of this 
excess of signification I will explore how legal power is projected out into the 
street.  In the examples which follow this is effected, in the first place, spatially.  
By means of axes, symbols, and their very names, streets become conduits of 
legal power conjuring images of the state.  But they are more than this: they are 
the space of everyday public life.   
 
3 Axes and alternative representations of power 
 
I begin from the originating place, the ground zero of law's power, the courtroom. 
Kelsen might maintain that law rests on the Grundnorm of the constitution, but J. 
L. Austin knew how to do things with words, issuing from the mouth of someone 
in an authorised position.24 If we are going to take seriously the body which 
speaks with authority, we must also take seriously the position from which it 
speaks. Even if a person has been duly sworn as a judge, the opinions she 
expresses over dinner do not have the force of law: the judge must also be in an 
authorised place. The power of the law is projected from the bench where the 
judge sits.  The bench has particular insignia symbolising the jurisdiction, that is, 
the judge's authority to give diction to the law (juris).  This is often a flag, while in 
Australia and Canada the key symbol is usually a coat of arms. In Australia this 
object, usually in three dimensions or bas relief, is placed over the head of the 
judge, either on the wall behind or, particularly in older courts, on a canopy 
above. I have described elsewhere how these obscure signs, depicting heraldic 
devices of the British monarchy, lions, unicorns or Australian animals,  can 
scarcely be decoded in the language of daily life. Even if we were to apply 
historical principles of heraldry we could still not know that this symbol denotes at 
once both the executive power of the state and the power of an independent 
judiciary.25 The mystery of the floating signifier is already apparent! 
 
Now we have a full set of conditions for constituting the authority of the law.  We 
have a judge, duly sworn and appropriately dressed.  The judge is sitting in a 
proclaimed place26 in a dedicated building in a courtroom which is specific to the 
job of judging, on the bench, under the coat of arms or by a flag signifying the 
jurisdiction which authorises the judgement.  We may next explore the space 
around this scene.  So far the power of the state (through its symbols) has 
constituted the law, and together they have constituted judicial authority.  Now we 
need to see how it is that judicial authority can order the world.  This is how 
Geertz put it, in his discussion of the constitutive power of law: 
                                            
24 See, generally, Austin, supra n. 8 and Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre), 
trans. Max Knight. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967). 
25 Richard Mohr, “Enduring Signs and Obscure Meanings: Contested Coats of Arms in Australian 
Jurisdictions”, in Contemporary Issues of the Semiotics of Law, ed. Ann Wagner, Tracey 
Summerfield and Farid Benevides. (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 179-195) at 193-5. 
26  'The Governor may, by proclamation, specify places at which the Court may sit, and one of 
those places shall be Sydney.' District Court Act (NSW) 1973, S 18. F (1) . 
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Law, even so technocratized a variety as our own, is, in a word, … constitutive 
….  A notion, however derived, that adjudication consists in a willed disciplining 
of wills, a dutiful systematization of duties, or an harmonious harmonizing of 
behaviors … contributes to a definition of a style of social existence…27 
 
How does adjudication do this?  How does it escape the courtroom, in order to 
discipline, to order and to re-constitute the power of the state, thus re-constituting 
the judicial power itself?  Just how does it define social existence? 
 
Let's take a closer look at the courtroom itself, in order to see some of the spatial 
elements which are used to project power.  In Australia the coat of arms and the 
judge are generally in the centre of the court.  The representatives at the bar 
table are equidistant from the judge, representing the even-handedness of the 
court.  They are placed on either side of an axis which runs from the centre of the 
bench, where the judge is seated, through the middle of the courtroom and 
usually faces the public door into the courtroom. We may follow this axis out the 
door of the courtroom, into the street. I will deal shortly with some expressions of 
the continuity of these axes from the courtroom into the urban fabric. Of particular 
legal interest is the axis running from the centre of the bench of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Washington to the centre of the Capitol building. But 
first let us discover what we can of the rationale and history of this powerful urban 
form. 
 
The axis is an important and ubiquitous signifier of power in town planning. First 
used in the sixteenth century for representational more than functional purposes, 
the axis became an indispensable symbol (and at times a vehicle) of state power 
in national capitals from sixteenth century Rome to twentieth century Canberra. 
In the Rome of Sixtus V (1585-90) elaborate projects were designed, carried out 
or projected, which would inscribe a cross in the centre of Rome; a star 
symbolising the virgin Mary, health, Christ and the Pope himself; and the layout 
of the basilicas as the constellations Ursa Major and Ursa Minor (the latter 
representing Saint Peter's basilica at the pole star). These projects were realised 
as streets (the cross), or partly realised with obelisks and vistas (the star), or 
were conceptual depictions (the constellations). Together they layed a 
representational framework over the city which stamped it with the "immense 
authority of the Pope".28 
 
This elaborate and decidedly pre-modern scheme for representing authority 
through streets, monuments, sight lines and imaginary plans reflecting the 
heavens is replete with floating signifiers. It can be seen to have influenced the 
next four hundred years of planning capital cities. The best known examples of 
axes in town planning occur in the great capitals of the classical period of the 
                                            
27 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983), 218. 
28 Maria Luisa Madonna (ed), Roma di Sisto V: Arte, architettura e città fra Rinascimento e 
Barocco (Roma: Edizioni De Luca, 1993) 20-23 
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consolidation of centralised state power: just that period when law's ambit was 
becoming marked by space rather than personal characteristics.  
 
The axis is a line of sight. Lines of sight work both ways. While we look up to the 
judge in the centre of the courtroom, the judge has a clear line of sight down from 
the bench.  Axes allow a clear view of the city, an assessment of the state of 
discipline in town. David Hockney has pointed to the contemporaneous 
development of perspective and artillery: "a line of sight can also be a line of 
fire".29  The opening up of the boulevards in Paris or the Ringstrasse in Vienna 
offered a clear shot and a direct route from the barracks to the workers' districts. 
This was the "strategic basis for the perspectival articulation" of Paris.30 Military 
forces can shoot and march troops down the boulevards. They can also see 
down them. Yet even the movement of troops was used to signify as much as to 
wield power.  
 
"The aesthetic effect of the regular ranks and the straight line of soldiers is 
increased by the regularity of the avenue: the unswerving line of march greatly 
contributes to the display of power, and a regiment moving thus gives the 
impression that it would break through a solid wall without losing a beat. That, of 
course, is exactly the belief that the soldier and the Prince desire to inculcate in 
the populace: it helps keep them in order without coming to an actual trial of 
strength, which always carries the bare possibility that the army might be 
worsted."31 
 
That the role of the axis as a trope of the capital city both predated and outlasted 
its strategic importance for the movement of troops emphasises its 
representational significance. It is a remarkably durable form. Mumford refers to 
those urban plans based on avenues, vistas and the projections of power as 
"baroque", rather stretching the historical reference of the word to encompass the 
fourteenth century arcades of Florence and L'Enfant's 1791 plan of Washington 
DC. He runs into political as well as temporal problems with this categorisation 
since he also associates the baroque with absolutist monarchical regimes, an 
uncomfortable fit with the capital of the new American republic. Extending the 
frame of reference even further, to twentieth century Australia, we find that 
avenues, vistas–in short, axes–are particularly explicit in the town planning of 
Canberra.  
 
Initially planned by the team of the Griffins, and implemented since the 1920s by 
the National Capital Development Commission, Canberra is as alive with axes as 
any baroque city. The Federal Courts face an axis which begins with University 
Avenue and becomes the minor axis of Constitution Avenue. We see the 
Parliament from all directions, framed by the city to either side of the roads. We 
look up to it, on its hill. By placing a symbolic building at the vanishing point the 
                                            
29 Quoted in Peter Jukes, A Shout in the Street: The Modern City (London: Faber & Faber, 1990), 
104-5. 
30 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. (Cambridge, MA: 
Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 121. 
31 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations and its Prospects 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) 423 
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planners focus attention on the Parliament, emphasising its preeminent power. It 
is at the focal point of the two traffic streets of Commonwealth Avenue and Kings 
Avenue, coming in from the business district and from the Department of 
Defence, crouched behind the 73 metre high American eagle which 
commemorates the US-Australia defence alliance.32 The War Memorial is on a 
central axis, free of cars. In the intention of the planners and the government this 
is a pedestrian space, devoted to people and plants and interrupted only by the 
old Parliament House.33   
 
The axis between the Capitol and the Supreme Court in Washington is more like 
a mutual salute than a defensive strategy. The axis of the Supreme Court faces 
the towering Capitol in a gesture of fidelity. Facing back the other way we may 
walk from the direction of the Capitol up the steps of the Supreme Court and 
down the length of the Great Hall through the public door into the courtroom, 
where its curved back wall reflects the power of the bench back onto us like the 
parabola of a satellite dish. This is where blame is allocated. The buck stops 
here.   
 
Outside the cars move up and down Constitution Avenue, which borders the 
parklands in which the Capitol and the Washington Monument are set. West-
bound traffic passes between the Monument and the White House lawns. East-
bound traffic quickly disgorges into the poor Afro-American districts with security 
grilles or bullet-proof glass on every window, even those through which 
commerce must be done: buying petrol or fried chicken. The stately flow of the 
cars does nothing to unsettle the fiction of the state. The legislative traffic flows 
down Constitution Avenue between the lawns of the White House and the 
Capitol, the Capitol and the Court. From this tourist's eye view of Washington, we 
can see the Grundnorm, and it works. No problem here for the constitutive theory 
of law, for the judges, town planners or presidents. 
 
Space is a medium for signs: what can it signify? Washington represents the 
separation of powers in the placement and the built form of the government 
buildings and the naming of Constitution Avenue. As I said in introducing this 
study, representations of the separation of powers exude an excess of 
signification. They invite us to interpret them in so many ways that we cannot 
count them, or even express them all. From this they derive their power. 
However,  the space of the city is more than a theme park of state power: it is the 
theatre of our everyday life. Urban spaces, particularly streets, also have 
meanings that are expressed by pedestrians, the people who use the street.  
                                            
32 'Opened by Her Majesty the Queen on 16 February 1954, [the monument] expresses the deep 
gratitude felt by Australians to American service personnel for their assistance to Australia during 
the War in the Pacific from 1941-1945.' Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Media Release 
(27/2004): 50th Anniversary of Australian-American Memorial, 16 February 2004. As the Minister 
makes clear, the monument and its commemoration still have semiotic work to do in invoking 
history and the alliance in support of Australian and US armed forces 'working side by side 
around the globe and in our own region – in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.'  
33 I will return shortly to discuss the indeterminacies of meaning introduced by people: 
'pedestrians', in the language of the planners. 
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These subversive interpretations may be explicit, in the form of protests.  
Demonstrators are often seen beyond the White House lawns. The central axis to 
Canberra's Parliament House has, for more than thirty years, been occupied by 
the Aboriginal Tent Embassy.34 These protests explicitly address the semiotics of 
the capital. They face the White House, or interrupt an axis of power. They 
indicate the potential for alternative meaning-making within the context of an 
existing signifier. The choice of space in which these protects take place seems 
to recognise the dominance of their power. By adding yet another interpretation 
to the floating signifiers of state power, they emphasise their excess of 
signification, even as they interrupt their channels of power.  
 
The Aboriginal protest interrupts the main axis signifying the power of the 
Parliament of Australia with an inhabited camp which recalls a way of life which 
preceded British colonisation. The Tent Embassy is thus a permanent reminder 
of prior occupancy of the land and the prior claims of an alternative legal system. 
Demonstrations at the White House may reinforce the legitimacy of the legal 
system which they recognise by their presence, but the Tent Embassy 
juxtaposes Aboriginal sovereignty to that of the Commonwealth. While the plan 
and the vistas of Canberra recall the legal process by which the state is 
constituted, their interruption by a living reminder of a competing source of law 
threatens to throw the astrology of state power off its axis. 
4 Naming and commemoration  
 
Up to this point I have focused on the spaces around courts and on those spaces 
which concentrate representations of the formal power of the state. In national 
capitals, I referred to streets bearing names representing legal instruments and 
forms: Constitution Avenue, Commonwealth Avenue. These names are part of 
the self conscious meaning-making of politicians and others who are in a position 
to wield this power of coding and commemoration.  
 
Gramsci identified street names as part of the material ideological structure of the 
dominant class which is "intended to maintain, to defend and to develop the 
theoretical and ideological 'front'."  He could only dream in a fascist prison of 
chronicling all those devices, which would include the media and the associations 
of civil society, "right through to architecture and the layout of streets and their 
                                            
34 I have discussed the Tent Embassy in the context of alternative interpretations of the coat of 
arms based on alternative interpretants (supra n. 25). Since writing that analysis I have seen a 
documentary film in which the Yolngu Aboriginal people of Northern Australia see the use of local 
animals (which represent their moieties) as giving the Australian law more, not less, legitimacy. It 
was not 'another law but it was the law for Australia.' (Tom Murray. Dhakiyarr vs the King. 
Lindfield, NSW: Film Australia, 2004) When I sought permission from them to use this clip from 
the film for teaching purposes, the Yolngu representatives explicitly asked me not to confuse their 
position with that of the Tent Embassy. This illustrates the power of the coat of arms as a floating 
signifier. The more interpretations it can be given, the more power it has.  
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names".35  We gain some more insight into the practical application of such a 
strategy from the comments of the mayor of Rome on the commemoration of the 
sixtieth anniversary of the defeat of fascism. Concerned at recent manifestations 
of "the historical and political forgetting that can lead a boy to fly a fascist flag in 
the football stadium", Mayor Veltroni proposed to encourage a more acute 
memory of events of the 1940s by renaming a school and an avenue in a park 
after students who were killed by "the Nazi madness".36 
 
Street names are an intricate part of memory. One of the first things we must 
commit to memory as children is the name of the street we live in, and 
throughout life we orientate ourselves by the names of the streets we visit, travel 
through, live and work in. Street names are the link between the abstraction of 
the map and the mnemonic of narrative.37 They weave in and out of the narrative 
of our lives, whether as a memorised itinerary or a succession of homes and 
haunts. Can politicians or city officials re-code these memories into forms which 
will promote allegiance to a class (as Gramsci suggested) or to a belief in the 
state as a concrete product of legal fictions? 
 
Street names have more relevance and hence more specific reference as 
signifiers in some contexts than others. I have already referred to the semiotic 
lock-step of vehicular and legislative traffic on Washington's Constitution Avenue. 
I would like now to turn to more explicit examples of the ways in which the 
meaning-making of everyday life may overlay, and perhaps ultimately submerge, 
the signifiers of state power. To discover more about the relationship between 
intended meaning and day-to-day decoding I will consider some street names in 
more intensely lived-in spaces than the Constitution Avenues I have considered. 
 
Mexico City, Distrito Fedéral, in a style which is familiar from my other Federal 
districts examples (DC, ACT), also has streets named for the founding law of the 
republic, the Constitution of 1917. The Plaza de la Constitución lies between the 
Supreme Court and the Cathedral, which itself is practically built over an 
important Mayan temple. The palimpsest of tradition runs deep in this ancient 
city. The official name of the plaza is never used by the people, who call it the 
Zócalo. A few blocks away from this ceremonial centre of power, with its interplay 
of references to law, state, church and ancient culture, is another street named 
after the Constitution of 1917. This street modestly refers only to one article of 
the Constitution: it is Calle Artículo 123.   
 
                                            
35 Gramsci conveys his yearning for such a dream: 'quanti bellissimi capocronaca si potrebbero 
scivere sull'argomento!' Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere (Torino: Einaudi, 1975) vol 1, 
332-3. 
36 Beatrice Rutiloni, “'La memoria non dura un giorno.' Cortei e musica per il 25 Aprile”, La 
Repubblica, 21 April 2005, Cronaca di Roma iv. Of course, Rome already has a 'via Antonio 
Gramsci'.  
37 De Certeau traces the origins of maps out of itineraries, noting the generalising (scientific) 
purpose of maps compared with the narrative of itineraries. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of 
Everyday Life, trans. Steven F. Rendall. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 118-
22 
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Article 123 confers the right to dignified and socially useful work, while 
subsections prohibit child labour and refer to the eight hour day and other 
workers' rights. This is a busy street but it not a ceremonial thoroughfare.  There 
is no critical connection between major national institutions, no impressive vista. 
It is a work-a-day street, commemorating the right to work.  Article 123 is also 
represented in a Diego Rivera mural in the Palacio Nacional.  It was clearly a 
matter of pride that the Mexican Constitution had such a provision, and worth 
reminding workers and others that this right existed. In naming a street for an 
article of the Constitution I am suggesting, then, that it may have mnemonic and 
commemorative value. It may reinforce the allegiance of workers to the 
Constitution while raising awareness of a right which is notoriously difficult to 
enforce. It may have been more effective to have called the street Calle Derecho 
al Trabajo ('Right to Work Street'), but that would only have recalled an 
unrealised right, not the national Constitution.   
 
The state's intentions in naming streets can be subverted by popular usage, as in 
the use  of 'Zócalo' instead of 'Plaza de la Constitución'. It can also be contested 
by competing conceptions of the state and the nation.  We see this in name 
changes which follow regime change: St Petersburg to Leningrad and back 
again. To the words of the old song about Istanbul, 
"Why Constantinople got the works  
is nobodies' business but the Turks" 
it should be added that some Greeks may have had a different view.  
 
My last example of street names comes from Québec. Major streets in Montréal 
and Québec City are named Boulevarde René-Lévesque for the founder of the 
Mouvement souveraineté-association (MSA) in 1967, President of the Parti 
québécois, and Premier (Premier ministre) of Québec 1976-85.38  These streets 
were re-named after Lévesque died in 1987.  Streets, like cities, must lose a 
name in order to gain a new one. Will anyone object, or care about the old 
name?39 In Québec City, prior to 1988 Boulevarde René-Lévesque was 
Boulevarde St-Cyrille. It was changed only a few years after the 1985 Papal 
Encyclical Slavorum Apostoli on the 11th centenary of Saints Cyril & Methodius. 
Whatever the Catholic Church's view on this apparent slight, it did not have the 
power or the will to oppose it.   
 
In Montréal, the name that was lost came from that other target of Québec's 
'quiet revolution': anglophone hegemony.40  The Montréal street was previously 
named Dorchester Boulevard, after an 18th century British Governor of Québec 
and Governor-General of Canada, who had been wounded fighting the French in 
                                            
38  Assemblée Nationale de Québec http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fra/membres/notices/j-l/lever.htm 
accessed 6 April 2005. 
39  The rejection of an old name may be even more important than the adoption of a new one, as 
in the case of Piazzale Adolfo Hitler in Rome, changed to Piazzale dei Partigiani. 
40  'La révolution tranquille' refers to the transformation of Québec in the 1960-70s which saw a 
simultaneous decline in the ideological influence of the Catholic Church and the political influence 
of the English-speaking population. Of course, René Lévesque was a key figure in that 
'revolution'. 
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the battle of the Plains of Abraham. However, the English-speaking population 
had more temporal power in this situation than did the Church in Québec. The 
boulevard runs from the local government jurisdiction of the City of Montréal 
(arrondisement Ville-Marie) into that of Westmount, dominated by English 
speakers, who refused the name change. Boulevarde René-Lévesque only runs 
as far as the border with Westmount, at Atwater, where it reverts to the name of 
Dorchester.  At this corner I found that Anglophone intransigence had apparently 
upset someone enough that they deformed the 'Dorchester' sign, without 
managing to remove it altogether. Street names, as mentioned above, are 
commemorations: Lévesque could only be remembered after his death, while this 
entailed the concrete (or attempted) forgetting of St Cyril and Dorchester. 
 
This example from Québec highlights a key point about the signification of street 
names in the semiotic project of constructing /the state/ as a product of law. As 
well as commemorating the law itself, as in names like Constitution Avenue or 
Artículo 123, street names may commemorate particular law-makers. To choose 
a Québécois law-maker like Lévesque over an English one is to commemorate a 
preference for a source of law. The very suggestion that we may choose the 
source of law is perhaps the most subversive semiotic act of all, when it comes to 
the legal constitution of the state. The state loses the determinacy of its "claim to 
domination" which then becomes contingent on political choice.41 The street with 
two names, René-Lévesque and Dorchester, while commemorating two 
conflicting sources of law also commemorates the very contingency of the law 
itself in constituting the state.  
 
But what's in a name? The streets in the heart of a busy city are used by cars, 
pedestrians, people making deliveries, doing business and socialising. They 
bring life to the streets, which are a part of their own lives. This space is made by 
the people who use it, who live it.  It is the sort of space that de Certeau has in 
mind when he writes, "In short, space is a practiced place.  Thus the street 
geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers." 
42   
 
While street names may commemorate laws or law makers they are also part of 
our day-to-day discourse. They become directions, daily routes or special 
excursions, addresses, memories and mental maps. Street names are etched 
into our memory in a process which involves active coding of our own narratives, 
habits and itineraries as well as our use of the material that is provided, by way of 
the physical layout of the streets and their names. Those who give the streets 
their names are also working at the level of memory, encouraging us to recall 
particular legal foundations of the state, sources of law and other signifiers of 
legitimacy. These codings of personal and official memory become entwined, 
particularly in busy city streets, so that addresses, activities and memories of 
                                            
41 Abrams, having noted that the state 'never emerges except as a claim to domination' (see 
above), observes that this claim is most effectively challenged not by political theorists, whether 
Marxist or conservative, but in the 'specific exigency created when individual revolutionaries find 
themselves on trial for subversion, sedition or treason.' Supra n. 5 at 77. 
42 Supra n. 37 at 117. 
 16 
Boulevarde René-Lévesque or Calle Artículo 123 overtake the original 
significance of the names themselves. The Zócalo in Mexico City is an instance 
of popular memory dominating the official naming of the plaza after the 
Constitution: the density of the narratives of daily life in that place could not be re-
coded in line with official memory. The official narratives are more capable of 
dominating in the Constitution Avenues of Washington or Canberra, with their 
parklands and traffic. To borrow from David Byrne's song, the "Heaven" of 
planners and advocates of the state "is a place where nothing ever happens".43 
Where there is so much happening, as in downtown Montréal or Mexico City, the 
density of daily life, memory and meaning submerges the official meaning-
making. 
 
5 Re-coding law's spaces 
 
In these investigations of legal referents in the layout, use and naming of streets I 
set out to discover some of the possible processes by which the legal fiction of 
the state is in a permanent state of renewal. I proposed, in introducing this article, 
that for the state to continue to function as an effective floating signifier it would 
need to be continually constructed: it did not spring into being, once and for all, 
with the Royal ordinance of 1670 or the Act of Settlement of 1701. The strenuous 
efforts of constitutional courts and legal discourse to maintain the fictio legis of 
the state can be seen in any number of legal texts. Rather than analysing such 
texts I have tried here to understand the relationship between law and the 
constitution of the state by seeing how this may work at the level of practice 
through the social and material medium of space. 
 
Those instances where the state was found to be most definitively coded as a 
legal fiction–a unified entity subject to the rule of law–occur in purpose built 
capitals, dedicated to the business of the state. The baroque practices of coding 
narratives of the signifiers of power and authority into urban axes continue to 
serve the descendents of those early centralised states conjured by law. 
Exclusive jurisdiction over space is signified in in the heart of the capital by vistas 
and avenues which tell us of the separation of powers, the supremacy of 
parliament and the rule of law founded on a constitution.  
 
In cities where people go about their everyday activities, place names may 
commemorate particular law-makers or other sources of law. As the etymology of 
that word suggests, we remember laws or law-makers together with addresses, 
itineraries and the narratives and mental maps which make sense of our lives. 
On that terrain lawmakers and other political groups compete to interweave their 
signifiers of the sources of law into these constructions of memory. In cases 
where there is little contestation of the sources of law these commemorations are 
enacted and overlaid with little conscious attention to the state's legal foundations 
(of which more below). However, I have remarked on instances, in Australia and 
Canada, where the smooth coding of a monolithic legal foundation for the state 
                                            
43 Daviid Byrne, Heaven (Index/Bleu Disque, Sire Records 1979).  
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has been interrupted by Aboriginal and Québécois sovereignty claims. The 
memory of alternative sources of law challenges any state that rests its claims to 
domination on a homogeneous legal order. But to recognise the overlays of 
contingent memory is essential to an understanding of our coding and de-coding 
of urban space. Far from there being two competing orders, 'one of which must 
be right', there is no order other than that which we inscribe in our everyday 
practice of social space.  
 
Spaces in the centre of purpose-built capitals may bear an excess of 
signification, referring to the always-already but never-enough magic of the state. 
Yet city streets are so intensively used, spoken and re-represented that they can 
come to mean more than their names. Spaces and even buildings, as sites of 
human activity, participate in their own interpretation, recreating their 
hermeneutic framework day by day and hour by hour.  
 
Where law must be interpreted  through texts, the appeal to a unique founding 
text or a structure of positive law is always possible. Though the interpretation 
may be indeterminate, the signifier is clear. But in the interplay of law and space 
we find the codes being inscribed and re-inscribed, in city streets, in itineraries, in 
personal and collective narratives. Every interpretation is a re-coding. Law may 
be represented as a determinate code, but as soon as it is inscribed on the city it 
is already overcome by new interpretations and re-codings.  
 
When law becomes part of lived experience, the subjects, no longer a fictional 
construct of law, reinscribe the law in naming their own spaces and narratives 
and in mutual interpetation of eachothers' actions. In the production of space, as 
soon as Lefebvre's or Barthes' 'Ego' gets out of the car and into the street, feeling 
the texture of the pavement, the chill in the air, the humidity and the smells, she 
or he is participating and acting in an environment. Beyond Agamben's 
observation that without language there is no experience,44 we might add that 
there is no interpretation before experience. We interpret the claims of law using 
the interpretive frameworks within which they are located, including our own 
narratives and life experiences.  
 
I noted, in introducing this study, Lefebvre's criticism of Barthes' attempt to de-
code power, which "has no code … only strategies". He went on to say that the 
state could shift between codes at will. I have tried here to analyse this "dualism 
that opposes meaning to material reality" as one of the strategies of power, and 
to assess its successes and limitations.45 The significations of the state, 
constituted as a legal fiction, are always indeterminate. As a floating signifier, the 
state can indeed always mean more than is stated. The official spaces of national 
capitals can conjure the fictitious entity of the state which changes, seemingly "at 
will", between a unity, a trinity and a hydra-headed monster. But as we move 
away from the spaces designed to invoke the power of the nation state into more 
                                            
44 Giorgio Agamben, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione dell'esperienza e origine della storia (Torino: 
Einaudi, 2001), 44ff. 
45 Timothy Mitchell, “Everyday Metaphors of Power”, Theory and Society 19/5 (1990), 545-577 at 
546. 
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anarchic spaces, places of work and commerce, law and the social order may be 
constituted differently. The meanings of the state are also indeterminate because 
its significations are de-coded and re-coded in an endless process of action and 
experience. Far from experiencing a duality between the material and the 
semiotic in everyday life, we code places, actions and memories into narratives 
and desires. Deprived of its transcedent semiotic possibilities by everyday life, 
the floating signifier can be weighed down, and finally submerged, under our 
constant communication. The inhabitants of cities say more than the signifier can 
ever mean.  
 
